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I~ THE SUPREME COURT OF T:r-IE STATE OF UTAB 
T4S STATE OF UTA:'-!, 
Plaintiff-Respondent,: 
-v-
SAVADOP E. PACHECO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 17527 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT IJF T:t"S "7A"'JTRS OF 1'1{E CASE 
The appellant, SAVADOR E. PACHF:CO, appeals from a 
conviction of Theft in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, SAVADOR E. PACHECO, was found guilty of 
Theft, a Third Degree Felony, by a jury. The trial was conducted 
December 17, 1980 with the Honorable Dean E. Conder, presiding. 
Appellant was sentenced m December 22, 1980 to serve an 
indeterminate term of 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction. 
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STATEMENT OF TBE FACTS 
The State filed charges against appellant alleging 
Theft occurring on July 28, 1980. At trial, the owner testified 
that he received two checks earlier in the business day and put 
them under a handle on the top of a locked cash box. qe further 
testified that the cash box was located in an inner office on a 
table. The owner, when asked if anyone besides a customer was in 
the store on that date, testified that he saw a short, dark man 
with long hair in the store. The owner testified that he had a 
conversation with this man in which the man asked for a job. The 
owner told the man no and he went out the front door. At 
approximately 5:30 or 6:00 p.m. that same afternoon, the owner 
discovered the checks were missing when he was preparing his daiG 
deposit. He then notified police. 
The appellant, testifying in his own behalf through a 
translator, testified that he was in the Allstates Wholesale 
Company on July 28, 1980. He testified that he had gone to anothe' 
store in the neighborhood to look for work before going to Allsta:0 
'ie testified that he obtained an application from the first busine; 
and was carrying it when he went to All states. Appellant further 
testified that when he arrived he didn't see anyone in the store. 
He leaned against a counter in front of the store, knocked on it 
to get someone's attention, and didn't get any answer. Appellant 
testified that he turned around quickly, knocking some papers off 
the counter in doing so. 'ie picked them up and noticed a paper 
which looked like scratch paper which people had been doing sums c· 
As he was straightening up, the owner came in and appellant tried 
to ask him in English for work. The owner didn't seem to under st; 
-:2-
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:1e appellant very well, but he did seem to understand that appellant 
ws looking for work. After being told no, appellant left the 
store with the papers in his hand. 
After leaving the store appellant testified that he was 
going to a factory that manufactured toys. As he walked away 
irom Allstate he put all the papers, including the job application, 
in his pocket. Appellant testified that he took the papers out 
later and noticed that two of the pieces of paper had a peso sign 
oo them. It took appellant several minutes to realize that what 
~e had were, in fact, checks. Appellant testified that he was 
always paid in cash in Mexico, where he lived until approximately 
:wo years ago, and that no one in his immediate family had checking 
accounts. 
Appellant testified that after he realized that the pieces 
of paper were checks he thought he would either take them back to 
the company or throw them away because he thought they had no 
value to him. Appellant further testified that he hadn't intended 
to take the checks from the Allstate company. 
Appellant also presented evidence by expert testimony from 
a bank officer in Salt Lake County, Ms. Mary Lou Vrabec, who 
testified that the checks admitted as states exhibits but without 
endorsements would be of no value to any bank under current banking 
oractice. 
The Judge denied appellant's motion to charge the jury 
only on a Class B misdemeanor based on the lack of value of the 
c:Ceck. 
Appellant was convicted by the jury of the third degree 
as charged and after a pre-sentence investigation which 
-3-
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revealed no prior arrests or convictions, he was sentenced to pri~-
for the term provided by law. 
POINT I 
AFTER APPELLANT PRESENTED EVIDENCE AS TO THE 
VALUE OF THE CHECKS AND THE STATE DID NOT REBUT 
THIS TESTIMONY, COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR 1:'1 fAILING 10 GRANI DEFENJJANI S MOIION 
FOR REDUCTION OF '1:1l": CHARGE . 
Appellant was charged with theft, a third degree fel~v 
• , I 
of property over two hundred fifty dollars but less than one 
thousand dollars. Under Utah Code Annotated §76-6-101(4) (a,b,c) 
(1953 as amended) the value of stolen property is to be determined 
as follows: 
"Value" means: the market value of the property 
if totally destroyed, at the time and place of the 
offense, or where cost of replacement exceeds the 
market value; or (b) where the market value cannot 
be ascertained, the cost of repairing or replacing 
the property within a reasonable time following 
the offense, and (c) if the property damaged has 
a value that cannot be ascertained by the criteria 
set forth in subsections (a) and (b) above, the 
property shall be deemed to have a value not to 
exceed $50.00. 
In State v. Logan, (563 P. 2d Sll) this court stated that 
the only definition of value in the criminal code of the State of~i 
is found in §76-6-101 (supra). The court concluded that this appL 
only to property which is totally destroyed and doesn't apply to 
property which is merely stolen but later recovered. The court 
further stated: 
We find no other statute on this subject and 
therefore, conclude that the statute is to be 
narrowly construed within its stated meaning 
and that there is no existing statute as to 
the value of stolen property which is not 
ultimately destroyed. That being the case, 
we must look to the common law and to the 
existing case law to determine the proper 
test of value applicable herein. 563 P.2d at 813. 
-4-
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The court said that, in general, the measure of the 
·;alue is its fair market value at the time and place where the 
3 Ueged crime was committed. (52 A C.J.S. Larceny §60(2) 489). 
The court then cited State v. Clark, 537 P.2d 820, for the 
standard for determining whether the crime charged is to be petit 
or grand larceny. In Clark the court stated: 
"There is no doubt that the proper standard 
by which a jury should determine "value" in 
a case such as this is market value. Market 
value is defined in this state as the price 
which a well-informed buyer would pay to a 
well-informed seller, where neither is obligen 
to enter into the transaction. 537 P.2d 15 824. 
Since the stolen property in che present case is checks 
rhe willing buyer is normally the drawee bank. (People v. Marques, 
520 P. 2d 113 (1974)). A check is defineC: as a negotiable instrument 
in Utah Code Annotated 70 A-3-104 (1953 as amended). However, 
1Jtah Code Annotated 70 A-3-201 (3) 1953 as amended, states in part 
that: 
Negotiation of an instrument takes place only 
when the endorsement is made and until that 
time there is no presumption that the transferee 
is the owner. 
3ecause the willing buyer in a check case is normally 
the drawee bank, someone knowledgeable in banking procedure is 
qualified to present testimony as to the market value of the checks 
·.-1hen they were stolen. At:_ trial, appellant introduced testimony 
:~om ~s. Mary Lou Vrabec as to the value of the checks. Ms. 
1
.'rabec had been employed in the banking industry for approximately 
seven and one half years at the time of trial. Her testimony as 
to •1alue follows in part: 
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Q: Those two checks appear to be issued on the 28th day 
of July, 1980, and presuming that those two checks 
were in the hands of All states Wholesale, the first 
party on that check in the condition which appears 0" 
the second of the xeroxed sheet? · 
A: This one here? 
Q: That's correct. 
A: Okay. 
Q: Can you tell me at that precise moment what the value 
of those two pieces of paper would be to Allstates-
checks in that same form? 
A: There would be no value until it's properly enders~ 
and presented. 
Q: What do you mean by endorsed then? 
A: Okay. It would have to be endorsed by Allstates ~oh 
Q: 
A: 
Q: 
A: 
Q: 
And then what would the value be after it was endorsei 
As long as there is no stop payment on the check and. 
is collected funds which the maker's bank are willir:5 
to release the value would be of the checks. 
All right. So let me say this, presuming then that' 
know that the amounts on those checks would be paid b:· 
the banks, the First Security and the Commerical 
Security Banks; would the value still be nothing ~t[ 
it was endorsed, the value to Allstates would still~ 
nothing until it was endorsed? 
Yes. 
Okay; and when you talk about stop payments and deli·1° 
to banks et cetera, that's banking procedure, is that 
correct? 
A: Yes. It is. 
Q: And would you say that basically when banks have chec 
accounts your bank for instance buys paper from 
another bank basically; are you giving out money in 
exchange for paper aren't you? 
A: Yes. 
-6-
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Q: And those banks do those kind of transactions 
all day long. In other words--
A: True. 
Q: -- in other words look at the value of the paper 
and pay money on it in exchange for that paper, right? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And again, in the condition reflected by those xeroxed 
copies, what would be the value for instance to your 
bank in that same condition? 
A: No value whatsoever. 
Earlier in the trial, testimony from the manager of Allstates 
revealed that when the checks were stolen, they had not been endorsed. 
Thus, Ms. Vrabec's testimony as to the value of the unendorsed checks 
fulfills the requirement of Utah Code Annotated §76-6-101 (4)(a) which 
defines value as the "value of the property at the time and place of 
the offense." Appellant's witness testified that the value of the 
checks when they were stolen was nothing. The State presented no 
evidence as to any other value and thus appellants witness' testimony 
constituted unrebutted evidence. When evidence is unrebutted, the 
court in Thomas v. Thomas (565 P.2d 722) stated: 
" ... the legal fundamental is that the court is 
bound by undisputed evidence so long as it is not 
inherently improbable. 565 P.2d 725. 
Obviously here the evidence was not inherently improbable 
~d the trial court erred in denying the motion to reduce the charges 
against appellant. 
-7-
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POINT II 
I 
I 
a cri~:·11 
action has the right to submit to the jury his theory of the case. 
A: THE DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE HAS A 
RIGHT TO SUBMIT HIS THEORY OF THE CASE TO 
THE JURY IN INSTRUCTIONS A"lD FAILURE TO DO 
so CONSl'II'DIES PREJUDICIAL ERROR. 
It is well established in Utah that an accused in 
and that such theory when properly requested should be given to t\; 
jury in the form of written instructions. State v. Stenbeck, 2 P.: 
1050 (1931). This right of the defendant exists as long as there. 
any substantial evidence to justify giving such an instruction. 
State v. Gillian, 463 P.2d 811 (1970); State v. Johnson, 185 P.2d 
738 (1947). 
In the present case, appellant contends that the evidenc'/ 
he presented at trial easily met the substantilal evidence test anc I 
therefore his proposed instruction pertaining to his theory of the I 
case should have been given. Appellant presented unrebutted test:J 
at trial as to the market value of the checks at the time and plac; 
the crime was committed and contends that his submitted instructio: 
should therefore have been given as proposed: 
When the value of property alleged to have been 
taken by theft must be determined, the market value 
at the time and in the locality of the theft shall 
be the test. The value is the highest price, 
estimated in terms of money, for which the property 
would have sold in the open market at the time and 
in the locality, if the owner was desirous of selling, 
but under no urgent necessity of doing so, and if 
the buyer was desirous of buying but under no urgent 
necessity of doing so, and if the seller had a 
reasonable time within which to find a purchaser, and 
the buyer had knowledge of the character of the 
property and of the uses to which it might be put. 
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Appellant contends that to refuse to give this 
instruction after he put on substantial evidence justifying it was 
reversible error as reiterated by the court in Gillian (supra), 
quoting State v. Newton, (144 P.2d 290, 1943): 
. each party is entitled to have his theory 
of the case which is suoported by competent 
evidence submitted to the jury by appropriate 
instructions, and the failure to present for the 
jury's consideration a party's theory by 
appropriate instructions constitutes reversible 
error. 144 P.2d at 292. 
Appellant believes that the facts in his case fit squarely 
within the confines of the test above and thus the failure of the 
trial court to submit the proposed instruction clearly constitutes 
reversible error. 
POINT II 
B: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING 
INSTRUCTIONS 18 AND 22 BECAUSE THEY--wfRE 
INCORRECT STATEMENTS OF THE LAW IN UTAH. 
Appellant contends that the court erred when it gave 
instruction Number eighteen to the jury because it plainly misstated 
the law in Utah. The instruction given by the court is as follows: 
You have been instructed regarding the essential 
elements of the crime of theft which the State 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The State 
need only prove those essential elements. 
In other words, in the crime of Theft, it is not 
necessary for the State to prove and you are not 
to consider in your deliberations, whether the 
checks had any value to the person who took them 
from the owner. 
The second paragraph of this instruction is a misinterpretation of the 
law. The controlling statute in this case is Utah Code Annotated 
P6-6-101 (4-a, b, c), 1953 as amended, which states: 
-9-
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"Value" means: a) the market value of the 
property if totally destroye4 at the time 
and place of the offense, or where cost of 
replacement exceeds the market value; or 
b) where the market value cannot be 
ascertained, the cost of repairing or 
replacing the property within a reasonable 
time following the offense, c) if the 
property damaged has a value that cannot 
be ascertainea by the criteria set forth 
in subsections a) and b) above, the 
property shall be deemed to have a value 
not to exceed $50.00. 
If the property was not destroyed but later recovered, the controi: 
case is State v. Logan, supra, which held that the appropriate ~~ 
to be used is the market value of the property; that is, the priCT 
a well-informed buyer would pay to a well-informed seller where 
neither is obliged to enter into the transaction (State v. Logan, 
563 P.2d 811, 1977). It is obvious that neither the controlling 
statute nor Logan,supra, which interprets the statute, have any 
language pertaining to value which could possibly be used as a 
basis for instruction number eighteen. Appellant contends that t·' 
giving of this instruction was a misstatement of the law which 
resulted in prejudicial error. 
Appellant also contends that court's instruction number 
twenty-two, for the same reasons as enumerated immediately above 
is also erroneous and a misstatement of the law. Instruction twer 
two as given to the jury is as follows: 
You may find that a check is a writing which 
represents value to the owner. In determining 
the amount of value of a check you may consider 
the written face value of the check and the 
testimony of competent witnesses as to the 
value of the check. 
-10-
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~his instruction obviously distorts the law by weighting the 
:estimony of the State's witness and giving no legal credit to the 
evidence that appellant presented. 
In a recent case, the court observed that even if defendant 
argued his theory to the jury ( which did not occur in the present 
case) it would be no help where " the jury was misinformed about the 
law to be applied." (State v. Wanrow, SS9 P.2d S4S, at SSS, 1977). 
~ clarify the standard on review the court quoted a test set out 
in State v. Britton, (178 P.2d 341) which is to be applied to cases 
in which the instruction given is an erroneous statement of the law; 
When the record disclosed an error in an instruction 
given on behalf of the party in whose favor the 
verdict was returned, the error is presumed to have 
been prejudicial, and to furnish ground for reversal, 
unless it affirmatively appears that it was harmless ... 
A harmless error is an error which is trivial, or 
formal, or merely academic, and was not prejudicial 
to the substantial rights of the party assigning 
it, and in no way affected the final outcome of 
the case. (Emphasis added) Id. at SSS. 
Applying this test to the instant case, it is evident that 
the errors in court's given instructions eighteen and twenty-two 
:•ere not harmless and thus were clearly prejudicial to appellant's case. 
Thus, it is appellant's contention that these erroneous instructions 
constitute reversible error. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT WAS PREJUDICED WHEN, IN FI~AL REBUTTAL, 
THE PROSECUTOR STATED THAT SHE :IAD TAKEN GOOD NOTES 
DURING TRIAL AND PROCEEDED TO TESTIFY FROM HER NOTES 
AS A WITNESS BEFORE THE JURY. 
-11-
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This court recently reiterated the State's general pol~, 
that, although charged with vigorously enforcing the laws the 
prosecutor: 
"has a duty to not only secure appropriate 
convictions, but an even higher duty to see that 
justice is done. In his role as the State's 
represetntative in criminal matters, the 
prosecutor, therefore, must not only attempt 
to win cases, but must see that justice is done. / 
Walker v. State of Utah, 624 P.2d 687, at 691. J 
See also Codianna v. Morris, 594 P.2d 874, at 877 (1979) 
During her final rebuttal, the prosecutor stated to the j: .. 
"Did he say he usually kept checks in his cash box 
in his inner office? I say he didn't. I wrote 
down these guestions before I asked him and I 
wrote down is answers." (Emphasis added). 
These statements of the prosecutor are clearly improper and amount :I 
the giving of unsworn testimony. 
In State v. Valdez (513 P. 2d 422) the court pointed out th;: 
"counsel for both sides have considerable latitude 
in their arguments to the jury, they have a right 
to discuss fully from their standpoints the 
evidence and the inferences and deductions arising 
therefrom. The test of whether the remarks made 
by counsel are so objectionable as to merit a 
reversal in a criminal case is, did the remarks call 
to the attention of thejurors matters which they 
would not be justified in considering in determining 
their verdict, and were they, under the circumstances 
of the particular case, probably influenced by those 
remarks. 513 P.2d at 426. 
Appellant contends that the statements by the prosecutor, amounting 
to unsworn testimony did fulfill the requirements of the test in 
Valdez (supra). Prosecutor's introduction of her own unsworn testi:: 
certainly called jurors attention to matter which they normally 
would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict 
Considering prosecutor's status as the State's representative, it 
is highly likely that, under these circumstances, the jurors were 
influenced by those remarks. 
-12-
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I 
Utah Code Annotated §77-42-1 (1953 as amended) sets out 
rhe standard for judgment on appeal: 
"After hearing an appeal the court must give 
judgment without regard to errors or defects 
which do not affect the substantial rights of 
the parties. If error has been committed, 
it shall not be presumed to have resulted in 
~rejudice. The court must.be.satisfied that 
it has that effect before it is warranted in 
reversing the judgment. 
T~is statute was interpreted in State v. ~aton, 569 P.2d 1114 (1977) 
~hen the court stated that the question was whether, in light of the 
total picture, the prosecutors impropriety should be regarded as a 
prejudicial error and justify reversal of the conviction. The 
court noted that there should be no reversal merely to criticize 
a prosecutor who merely averstepped the bounds of propriety. 
However, in the case at bar, the prosecutor's remarks were 
::\ not merely an overstepped 
a nature that could easily be seen as prejudical error. 
of the bounds of propriety, but were of 
The court 
I 
in Eaton, supra, specifically spelled out the standard to be met 
in cases of prosecutorial misconduct when it held: 
.. we believe that, on appeal, when there is a 
reasonable doubt as to whether the error below was 
prejudicial, that doubt should be resolved in 
favor of the defendant ... consequently, the rule 
which we have numerous timesstated is that if the 
error is such as to justify a belief that it had 
a substantially a:lverse effect upon the defendant's 
right to a fair trial, in that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that in its absence there 
may have been a different result, then the error 
should not have been regarded as harmless." 
569 P.2d at 1116. 
Adhering to this standard, it seems clear that the prose-
cutor's comments (in the present case) served to produce a sub-
stantially adverse effect on the appellant's right to a fair trial 
\:i addir.g testimony as a witness without appellant being able to 
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confront or cross examine her. Thus, appellant contends that her 
comments raised more than a reasonable doubt that her corrrrnents 
were prejudicial. The duty of the prosecutor was very aptly 
stated by Justice Sutherland in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 
78, 79 L.Ed. 1314, 55 S. Ct. 629 (1935): 
... It is as much his duty to refrain from 
methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate 
means to brin~ about a just one. It is fair 
to say that the average jury, in a greater or 
less degree, has confidence that these 
obligations which so plainly rest upon the 
prosecuting attorney, will be faithfuly 
observed. (79 L. Ed at 1321). 
Thus, it is appellant's contention that the prosecutor's 
conmients were more than just improper, and that by, in effect givin~ [ 
unsworn testimony, she severely prejudiced the outcome of appellant' 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant contends that the court erred in not granting 
appellant's motion for a reduction of the charge after unrebutted 
testimony was presented which demonstrated that thec:hecks were 
valueless. 
Appellant also contends that the Court's instructions to 
the jury were an erroneous statement of the law. Appellant further 
contends that the court committed reversible error in failing to 
instruct the jury on appellant's theory of the case. Finally, it's 
appellant's contention that the prosecutor's misconduct in final 
rebuttal severely prejudiced the outcome of the case. 
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Thus, appellant asks that his conviction be reversed 
and judgment of acquittal be entered. 
DATED this ~-day of June, 1981. 
Respectfully submitted, 
(,.~~/;;il£c,;bU u 
GINGER L. FLETCHER 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114 this ~~-day of June, 1981. 
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